I. INTRODUCTION
The economic relationship between the People's Republic of China and Latin America has strengthened significantly over the past decade. 1 Trade is the main component of this growing relationship, and the increase in trade has led to increased Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. 2 More specifically, Chinese FDI has grown rapidly since the 2008 global financial crisis. 3 Investment in Latin America from Chinese companies has averaged approximately $10 billion per year since 2010-compared to a total of approximately $6 billion during the previous 20 years 4 -and state-owned Chinese companies have made significant investments in the natural resource sectors of Latin American economies. 5 Perhaps most importantly, Chinese FDI in Latin America is expected to grow in the coming years. 6 This growing economic relationship between China and Latin America has come at a time when the relations between the United States and many Latin American countries are in flux. For example, backlash against U.S. international economic policies has worsened relations between the United States and HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 37:3 This Comment will compare U.S. and Chinese economic policies in Latin America by focusing on U.S. and Chinese investment treaties with Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, the countries of the Pacific Alliance, an organization that aims to promote free trade and investment with a focus toward the AsiaPacific region. 11 Part II will discuss the background of recent relations between Latin America and China. Part III will discuss U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the investment provisions of free trade agreements (FTAs) with Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Part IV will discuss Chinese BITs and the investment provisions of Chinese FTAs with these same countries. Part V will discuss the larger effects for the global economy from the interaction between the United States, China, and Latin America. It will also discuss possible changes to U.S. investment policy in response to China's growing investment in Latin America. Part VI will conclude the Comment.
II. A NEW ERA OF CHINESE AND LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS
China's increased investment in Latin America is part of its strategy of economic and diplomatic engagement with developing countries. 12 Increased investment in natural resources and infrastructure as well as increased diplomatic activity have accompanied this strategy. 13 This section will discuss this economic and political engagement. It will first introduce the Pacific Alliance and its economic significance to Latin America. It will then briefly discuss China's increased political engagement in Latin America, Chinese FDI in the region, changes in Latin could be a serious threat to Latin America's exports); Gonzalo Sebastián Paz, China, United States and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin America: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic Challenge in the Region, CHINA Q., Mar. 2012, at 18, 32 (discussing how the United States has reacted to China's growing presence in Latin America).
11. The Pacific Alliance and Its Objectives, PAC. ALLIANCE, http://alianzapacifico.net/ en/home-eng/the-pacific-alliance-and-its-objectives (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) .
12. Nicola Phillips, China and Latin America: Development Challenges and Geopolitical Dilemmas, in CHINA, THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND THE NEW GLOBAL DYNAMIC 177, 177-78 (Lowell Dittmer & George T. Yu eds., 2010).
13. BRANDT ET AL., supra note 10, at 17; Dosch & Goodman, supra note 10, at 3, 7-9; see also Paz, supra note 10, at 32 (noting that an institutional dialogue has begun between China and the United States regarding China's involvement in Latin America, a region historically considered to be part of the United States' sphere of interest).
American approaches to investment treaties, and the different approaches that both the United States and China take in pursuing economic partners.
A. The Pacific Alliance
The Pacific Alliance was formed to promote economic integration of member countries and to negotiate FTAs as a group with Asian countries, the United States, and the European Union. 14 The alliance's pursuit of trade and investment with Asian counterparts, including China, is viewed as part of the expanding relations between developing countries known as "South-South cooperation." 15 It is also a result of the desire for Latin American countries to diversify their economic relations while lessening their economic dependence on the United States. 16 As a group, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru represent a significant share of Latin America's economy. 17 These countries provide a way to compare U.S. and Chinese investment 15. The United Nations defines South-South cooperation as "a broad framework for collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental and technical domains." What Is SSC?, UN OFF. FOR S.-S. COOPERATION, http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) .
16. For example, the U.S. Congress delayed approval of Colombia's free trade agreement with the United States, and Mexico's highly integrated economic relationship with the United States led it to follow the United States in the recent recession. Lima Declaration, supra note 14.
17. SCOTIABANK, LATIN AMERICA REGIONAL OUTLOOK 3-4, 10 (2015). The four countries represent 36% of Latin America's population (204 million), 35% of regional GDP ($1.7 trillion), and approximately 50% of Latin America's share in global trade ($1.045 trillion). Socorro Ramírez, Regionalism: The Pacific Alliance, AMS. Q., http:// www.americasquarterly.org/content/regionalism-pacific-alliance (last visited March 23, 2015). The Pacific Alliance as a total received $71 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2012, making it the world's seventh-largest FDI recipient for that year. Badawy, supra note 14.
approaches to the region directly, as they have strong economic relations with the United States and are increasing their economic relations with China. The differences within this group also contribute to this comparison. Mexico and Colombia are significant oil exporters and are more economically connected to the United States. 18 Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 19 and Colombia has strong political ties to the United States. 20 The economies of Peru and Chile rely on exports of natural resources, mainly copper, and are more economically connected to China. 21 
B. China's Policy Toward Latin America
China has pursued stronger diplomatic and cultural ties to Latin America by expanding diplomatic missions, sending trade delegations to Latin American countries, and promoting Chinese tourism and educational opportunities in the region. 22 In 2008, China issued its "Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean," which discussed the emergence of a multi-polar world with increased economic globalization. 23 the importance of Latin American and Caribbean countries to the developing world and noted their importance to regional and international affairs. 24 China's stated policy toward the region includes its desire "to build and develop a comprehensive and cooperative partnership" 25 and its efforts to strengthen cooperation between China and Latin American countries in both politics and economics. 26 Related to international investment, China's description of cooperation in international affairs included the aim to "make the international political and economic order more fair and equitable" and to "uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries." 27 China also stated that it will work with Latin American countries "to expand and balance two-way trade and improve the trade structure to achieve common development," and that it supports investment "to promote the economic and social development of both sides." 28 China also emphasized SouthSouth cooperation. 29 This includes "bringing about a more just and equitable multilateral trading regime" as well as increasing influence in "decision-making for developing countries in international trade and financial affairs." 30 
C. Chinese FDI in Latin America
In addition to political engagement, China's 2008 policy paper marked the beginning of a new era of increased Chinese FDI in Latin America and in the developing world generally. China became one of the world's three largest sources of foreign investment in 2012, when FDI from China reached more than $87 billion for that year. 31 33 Estimates put total FDI from China into Latin America at $80 billion as of the end of 2013. 34 Despite this growth, Chinese investment in the region has not kept pace with its growing trade relationship, as trade with China in 2010 represented 11% of regional trade but FDI from China represented only 1% of FDI into the region. 35 This gap could indicate the potential for more Chinese FDI in Latin America, as an increase in trade is likely to bring an increase in investment in the form of facilities to manufacture or assemble goods from China. 36 Adding to this potential is the possibility, by one estimate, that China's total outbound FDI will reach $1 trillion during the next ten years. 37 While China's FDI in Latin America is small compared to that of the United States, 38 it has the potential to overtake U.S. investment. 39 China has also made loans to Latin American countries to secure access to natural resources. 40 41 These loan commitments have been greater than those from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States combined. 42 These financial commitments in Latin America are part of China's strategy of engaging developing regions, and Latin America fits into this strategy as a source of natural resources. 43 Most Chinese mining investments in Latin America are in Peru, and Colombia has received Chinese investment in its oil industry. 44 Chile and Mexico have not had significant Chinese investment, 45 but that is likely to change. China views Chile, a significant producer of natural resources, as a strategic complement to its manufacturing economy and views Mexico as a potential source of oil. 46 
D. U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Foreign Investment Policy
Along with increased investment in Latin America, China has actively pursued FTAs and BITs with Latin American countries. China's approach to deciding which countries to pursue as economic partners differs significantly from the U.S. approach. The United States considers domestic politics, economic policy, partner country commitments to trade liberalization, and foreign policy. 47 Other considerations include a country's commitment to the rule of law, benefits to the broader U.S. trade liberalization strategy, compatibility with U.S. interests, and support from Congress and domestic industries. 48 These factors primarily reflect U.S. strategic, foreign policy and foreign economic development goals. 49 China's approach is to pursue partner countries that are rich in natural resources. 50 As part of its foreign policy principle of "non-interference," China places less importance than does the United States on the domestic politics of a partner country. 51 This means that China gives less consideration to a partner country's human rights, political system, environmental protection, or commitment to international trade. 52 Chinese officials have stated that a good political and diplomatic relationship with China is the most important factor in selecting partner countries, followed by complementary economic structures, a domestic market that could also serve as a trade hub, the common desire to join China in an FTA, and a strong economy. 53 In describing the investment approaches of the United States and China in Latin America, it is important to note briefly how countries in the region approach trade and investment agreements and how this approach has evolved over the past decades. 
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U.S. AND CHINESE INVESTMENT TREATIES 937 investors that often resulted in military interventions. 55 As part of this opposition, many Latin American countries adopted the Calvo Doctrine, which asserted state sovereignty, rejected special privileges for foreign investors, and required local laws to be used to settle disputes with foreigners. 56 After the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, Latin American countries were forced to fund development through FDI rather than through commercial loans. 57 To attract foreign investment, many countries abandoned the Calvo Doctrine and adopted BITs with strong investor protections. 58 Many countries also ended their industrial development strategy of replacing foreign imports with production from protected domestic industries and adopted free market economic reforms. 59 and to promote investment in BIT partner countries. 62 U.S. officials designed BITs to provide investor protection in areas in which they viewed customary international law 63 as inadequate. 64 The United States relied on model BITs in negotiations, as this allowed it to gain leverage by focusing on particular areas of interest rather than on negotiating every aspect of a treaty. 65 This section will discuss the U.S. model BIT approach to investment treaties and how it has influenced the investment provisions of FTAs with Mexico, Chile, Peru, and Colombia.
A. U.S. Model BIT
The stated goal of the U.S. BIT program is to protect private investment, develop market-oriented domestic policies in host countries, and "support the development of international law standards consistent with these objectives." 66 The U.S. model BIT provides six "core benefits" to protect investors and liberalize investment. 67 These benefits are: a minimum standard of treatment for investors and their investments; limits on expropriation; the free transfer of investment-related funds; limits on performance requirements; the right of an investor to choose its management; and the right to arbitration of investorstate disputes. 68 The provisions related to investor-state arbitration, standard of treatment, and expropriation provide a common framework for 
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analyzing the differences between U.S. and Chinese investment policy. They are explained briefly:
• Investor-state arbitration: Investors have the right to have a dispute with the host government heard before an international arbitration tribunal without first having to use the host country's domestic courts. 69 This provision is unique under international law as it provides a private right of action for investors against a host state. 70 Most other treaties allow only governments to bring a case against another government. 71 Because of this private right of action, investor-state arbitration is often considered the most important investor protection in a BIT. 72 • Standard of treatment: Both investors and their investments receive "the better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment for the full life-cycle of investment-from establishment or acquisition, through management, operation, and expansion, to disposition." 73 National treatment requires that a country treat a foreign investor and its investment the same as it treats domestic investors. 74 Most-favored-nation treatment requires that a country treat a foreign investor the same as it treats other foreign investors. 75 • Expropriation: Generally, expropriations are allowed only if they fulfill a public purpose, are non-discriminatory, there is "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation," 76 and they are done in accordance with due process of law and minimum treatment standards. 77 While the United States has negotiated almost fifty BITs since the 1980s, 78 since 1994, when NAFTA became law, it has incorporated BITs into FTAs. Following NAFTA, the United States made some fundamental changes to its model investment treaty in its trade agreement with Chile (2004) and further changes to the model were reflected in the trade agreements with Peru (2009) and Colombia (2012). A discussion of the evolution of the investment provisions in these trade agreements beginning with NAFTA provides a basis for comparing the evolution of Chinese investment treaties in the region.
B. NAFTA
Mexico depends on the United States as a market for its exports as well as a source of FDI, and NAFTA was conceived as a means to further integrate the North American economies. 79 Notably, NAFTA was the first FTA to include comprehensive investment protections, and its Chapter 11 on investments was based on the U.S. model BIT. 
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NAFTA represented a significant advancement in the liberalization of international investment. 81 Its definition of an investor as one "that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment" gives investors rights in the so-called "preestablishment" phase in which investors are merely considering making an investment. 82 This provision is noteworthy, as customary international law provides investment protection only after the investment has been established. 83 Most significantly, it gives an investor rights in this "pre-establishment" phase and takes away a host-state's right to regulate what FDI it admits into its territory. 84 Despite this substantial increase in investment liberalization, the investor-state arbitration provision has proven to be the most controversial investor protection in NAFTA, and disputes have centered around its standard of treatment "in accordance with international law" 85 and its prohibition of expropriation whether "directly or indirectly." 86
Investor-State Arbitration
NAFTA's investor-state arbitration provision allows for arbitration using the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Arbitration Facility Rules, and the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). 87 Before NAFTA, the United States used investor-state arbitration in BITs with "capital importing" countries, which are lesser-developed countries that depend on foreign investment for economic growth. With NAFTA, however, the United States now had an investorstate arbitration provision with a "capital exporting" and developed country in Canada. 88 Since its inception, the majority of NAFTA disputes have been between the United States and Canada, and Canadian investment disputes against the United States made the United States a host-nation respondent in investor-state arbitration for the first time. 89 
Standard of Treatment
NAFTA's Article 1104 on the standard of treatment states that investors and investments receive the better of national treatment under Article 1102 or the most-favored-nation treatment under Article 1103. 90 Articles 1102 and 1103 also include the phrase "in like circumstances," which arbitral tribunals have interpreted as a limit to the application of these clauses. 91 Article 1105 states that the minimum standard of treatment shall be "in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security." 92 The interpretation of the "fair and equitable treatment" standard of Article 1105 led to several major investment disputes. 93 NAFTA does not define "fair and equitable treatment," and this ambiguity led to disagreements about the scope and definition of the term "international law." 94 (2); see Berger, supra note 83, at 19 (explaining that the trend of including the phrase "in like circumstances" was started by the NAFTA countries to limit the application of the two clauses).
92. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1105(1). 93. Id. ("Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security."); see Tuck, supra note 80, at 389 (stating that after a series of arbitral decisions, the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" remains undetermined).
94. Tuck, supra note 80, at 389; Cross, supra note 62, at 159. Some arbitral tribunals interpreted the term "international law" to be broader in scope than "customary international law," with "customary international law" as the minimum of the fair and equitable treatment standard and Article 1105 setting a higher standard of treatment. Tuck, supra note 80, at 389; Cross, supra note 62, at 159. However, the Canadian Statement on Implementation of NAFTA stated that Article 1105(1) provides for minimum
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the term "international law" broadly to require only that foreign investors show that any treatment under dispute was in violation of a treaty or other international agreement, while others interpreted it as the narrower customary international law, which excludes treaties and other agreements. 95 NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals interpreted the "fair and equitable treatment" standard in several cases that turned on this interpretation of customary international law. 96 Inconsistent interpretations from these cases, however, led the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to issue a Chapter 11 interpretation of Article 1105 that narrowed investor protection and the scope of "fair and equitable treatment" by stating that customary international law was the minimum standard for "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security." 97 In keeping with this narrower scope, the interpretation also stated that a breach of another NAFTA provision or another international agreement is not necessarily a breach of Article 1105. 98 While 
Expropriation
NAFTA Article 1110 prohibits treaty parties from "directly or indirectly" nationalizing or expropriating an investment or taking "a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment." 102 While this provision includes exceptions when the expropriation is non-discriminatory, for a public purpose, and with due process and compensation, the idea that a regulation that reduces the value of investment results in "indirect expropriation" has proven controversial and led to a debate over the definition of the term. 103 The guidance on the definition of indirect expropriation. However, there remained confusion as to the extent that the value of an investment must be diminished to constitute this type of expropriation. 107 The tribunal in S.D. Myers clarified the ambiguous term "tantamount to expropriation" and found that "tantamount" meant "equivalent," which required the arbitral tribunal to go beyond "technical or facial considerations" to consider "the real interests involved and the purpose and effect of the government measure." 108 Following these arbitral decisions were concerns in the United States that investor-state arbitration under NAFTA would be used to challenge regulatory actions related to public health and the environment as well as decisions on expropriation that do not meet the standard of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
construction permit resulted in indirect expropriation of Metalclad's investment in COTERIN. The "investment" that was expropriated was Metalclad's interest in operating the hazardous waste facility on the property. 
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investor-state arbitration, the minimum standard of treatment, and expropriation. 115
Investor-State Arbitration
The U.S.-Chile FTA makes some significant changes to the investor-state arbitration system that began under NAFTA. Notably, the FTA parties can bring claims for breaches of an investment authorization, an investment agreement, or under Annex 10-F, which covers Chile's Foreign Investment Statute Decree Law 600, a statute designed to provide legal certainty to foreign investors in Chile. 116 The investor-state arbitration provision also expands the possible dispute settlement mechanisms from the limited number set forth in NAFTA by adding "any other arbitration institution or under any other arbitration rules." 117 In a significant change from earlier arbitration provisions, the FTA also gives the arbitral tribunal the authority "to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party." 118 Adding another feature not found in NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA allows for the possibility of appealing tribunal decisions. 119 It also adds an article on transparency, which requires the respondent to make public the documents of the proceedings and requires the proceedings to be held in public. 120 
Standard of Treatment
Article 4 of the U.S.-Chile FTA incorporated as the minimum standard of treatment the customary international law standard from the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105. 122 Importantly, the agreement further clarifies customary international law in Annex 10-A as law that results "from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation." 123
Expropriation
While, like NAFTA, the U.S.-Chile FTA permits expropriation for public purposes and with appropriate compensation, 124 the agreement builds on NAFTA and clarifies the terms "expropriation" and "indirect expropriation" through Annex 10-D. 125 Annex 10-D(1) narrows investor protections by stating that Article 10.9(1) "is intended to reflect customary international law" regarding expropriation. 126 The annex also defines "indirect expropriation" as actions that have an "effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure." 127 The use of "equivalent" clarifies the definition compared to the use of the more ambiguous term "tantamount" in NAFTA. 128 The definition of "indirect expropriation" also requires a case-by-case inquiry that 122. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 116, art. 10.4(1) (stating that "[e]ach Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security").
123. "Customary international law" generally and as specifically referenced in Article 10.4 and 10.9 results from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. With regard to Article 10.4, the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of aliens." Id. 147 China's BITs through the 1980s and 1990s either did not allow for arbitration of investorstate disputes or limited arbitration to disputes "involving the amount of compensation for expropriation." 148 It maintained this policy even after it signed the ICSID Convention in 1990. 149 Limiting the scope of arbitration was designed to preserve China's sovereignty and minimize legal actions. 150 As China became a significant capital exporter and developed its strategy to promote FDI abroad, its BIT policy began to include standard investor protections, such as fair and equitable treatment, most-favored-nation, and national treatment, as well 129 as broader dispute settlement clauses. 151 Over time, China also began to use less restrictive national treatment standards. 152 Prior to 2000, its BITs with developing countries did not include national treatment provisions at all. 153 After 2000, however, China began to refer to national treatment in its BITs, as the concept became increasingly accepted in Chinese law. 154 In contrast to the U.S. model BIT approach, China is flexible in its approach to investment treaty negotiations, and it often adopts aspects of the model treaties of its counterparts. 155 As a result of this strategy, China has adopted from its Latin American counterparts some of the investor provisions that developed under NAFTA. 156 To analyze the different outcomes that this negotiating strategy produces, this section will discuss early Chinese investment agreements with Chile and Peru and the development of later agreements with Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile. 157 
A. China's 1995 Investment Agreements with Chile and Peru
China signed BITs with Chile and Peru in 1994 and both went into effect in 1995. 158 These BITs are nearly identical and should be discussed together. They also provide a basis from which to analyze developments in subsequent Chinese investment treaties.
Article 3(1) of both the Peru-China BIT and the Chile-China BIT states that investments "shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment." 159 Peru include the term "national treatment," they provide for most-favored-nation treatment. 160 In an example of a mostfavored-nation clause found in China's older BITs, Article 3(2) of both treaties states that investor protection "shall not be less favorable than that accorded to investments and activities associated with such investments of investors of a third State." 161 Additionally, the agreements limit this treatment to later stages in which an investment has already been established. 162 The expropriation provisions in Article 4 of both the Chile and Peru BITs reflect U.S. standards by limiting expropriation to cases in which it is done for the "public or national interest," with domestic legal procedure, in a non-discriminatory manner, and with compensation for the investor. 163 The Chile and Peru BITs, like older Chinese BITs, have a limited investor-state dispute mechanism. 164 The investor-state dispute provision does not provide compulsory arbitration but requires that the parties first try to settle a dispute through negotiations and allows either party to submit the dispute to a host-state court if the parties do not settle the dispute within six months. 165 Importantly, the treaty allows compulsory international arbitration at the ICSID only for determining damages from expropriation claims. 166 Both treaties allow "[a]ny dispute concerning other matters" 167 to be submitted to international arbitration if both parties agree. 168 This gives the host-state a veto-like power over arbitration for disputes other than for the amount of damages, and, as one scholar wrote, reduces arbitration to "a mere symbolic nature." 169 The case of Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, the first investment arbitration case under a Chinese BIT, demonstrates the controversy over the limited scope of the investor-state dispute resolution provision and provides an example of an interpretation of the standard of treatment and expropriation clauses under an older Chinese BIT. 170 In that case, a Chinese investor with a 90% share in a Peruvian fishmeal exporter requested arbitration claiming that audit determinations and interim measures by Peru's tax authority were an unjustified indirect expropriation of his investment and a violation of the Peru-China BIT. 171 Peru responded that the BIT limits investorstate arbitration to disputes over the amount of compensation for expropriation and that the arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the claim. 172 Peru argued that its domestic courts have jurisdiction to determine if expropriation had occurred. 173 The arbitral tribunal, however, interpreted the scope of the dispute settlement provision as including not only the
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determination of the amount of compensation for expropriation but also the determination as to whether an expropriation had occurred. 174 The tribunal also found that the Peru tax authority's interim measures against the company interfered with its operations and were applied in an arbitrary manner that constituted indirect expropriation. 175 The Chinese investor tried to gain the benefit of Peru's other investment treaties by arguing that because Peru had signed other BITs that do not limit the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, he should receive the benefit of the BIT's most-favorednation provision under Article 3(2) and thereby the broader scope of its dispute settlement provision. 176 Nonetheless, the tribunal interpreted the investor-state clause as requiring that the dispute simply include the amount of compensation and not that it involve determining the amount of compensation only. 177 The tribunal, however, limited the scope of the most-favored-nation clause by stating that it does not "override" the investor-state arbitration clause. 178 The tribunal was also concerned that Peru's interpretation that a domestic court must decide if expropriation had occurred would effectively mean that an investor would never have access to arbitration. 179 This decision was criticized for not interpreting the most-favored-nation clause as protecting against discrimination among the parties to the treaty and for differentiating its application between general and specific provisions of the treaty. 180 
B. The "NAFTA-isation" of China's Investment Agreements

Mexico-China BIT (2008)
China signed its BIT with Mexico in July 2008 and it went into effect in June 2009. 183 The BIT with Mexico, a NAFTA country, is significant in that China's strategy of flexibility in negotiations with its counterpart countries resulted in its adoption of investment provisions similar to those in NAFTA.
The China-Mexico BIT includes a standard of treatment similar to that in China's earlier BITs with Chile and Peru. 184 However, Article 3 also includes so-called "grandfathered" national treatment, as it prefaces the national treatment clause by stating that it applies "[w]ithout prejudice to its laws and regulations at the time the investment is made." 185 This provides an example of the qualified national treatment standard that China has included in its BITs with developing countries that some scholars say limits it to a "best-efforts" clause." 186 However, the BIT also shows China's increasing adoption of NAFTA standards. 187 The BIT used the term "in like circumstances," a term first used in NAFTA, to narrow the scope of the most-favored-nation and national treatment clauses. 188 Article 5 also states that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full 181. Berger, supra note 83, at 2, 17. 182. Id. The China-Peru FTA followed the 2008 China-New Zealand FTA, which was China's first agreement with comprehensive investor rights and referred to "commonly accepted rules of international law" in its fair and equitable treatment clause. 
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protection and security" are provided "in accordance with international law." 189 However, in a notable change from earlier BITs, the Mexico-China BIT invokes customary international law by referring to "the international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as evidence of State practice and opinio juris." 190 This is similar to the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's interpretation of Article 1105, which stated that customary international law is the minimum standard and that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require a higher standard. 191 The expropriation provision in Article 7 mirrors NAFTA in that expropriation is allowed only if it is for a public purpose, is non-discriminatory, is in accordance with due process, and provides investor compensation. 192 Article 7 even uses the ambiguous phrase "tantamount to expropriation," which was used in NAFTA and was replaced by "equivalent to expropriation" in subsequent treaties. 193 In what is perhaps the most significant change from China's earlier BITs, Article 13 of the China-Mexico BIT provides a detailed description of investor-state arbitration. 194 While the earlier Chile and Peru BITs limited ICSID arbitration to the amount of compensation, the China-Mexico BIT allows for international arbitration for the breach of any investor protection in the treaty. American FTA that included an investment chapter, and the investment chapter is similar to the BIT with Mexico. 198 The expropriation provision is nearly identical to the earlier PeruChina BIT and the investor-state provision is largely the same as that in the Mexico-China BIT. 199 Adopting the standard first set in the Mexico-China BIT, its investor-state arbitration provision allows arbitration for any dispute. 200 Similar to the BIT with Mexico, a grandfather clause limits national treatment, as Article 130 states that national treatment does not apply to existing non-conforming measures. 201 Like the Mexico-China BIT, Article 129 on national treatment and Article 131 on the most-favored-nation treatment also use the NAFTA term "in like circumstances" to narrow the scope of interpretation. 202 Article 131 is the same as the Mexico BIT except that it adds the term "establishment" in the list of covered investment activities. 203 China resisted granting mostfavored-nation treatment to the pre-establishment phase as seen in NAFTA. 204 As a limit on investor-state arbitration, Article 131 does not allow most-favored-nation treatment to be applied in dispute settlement mechanisms. 205 The Colombia-China BIT in Article 2 continues China's inclusion of a minimum standard of treatment and China's growing acceptance of customary international law by stating that customary international law is the minimum standard of treatment for "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security." 214 In addition, the investor-state arbitration provision under Article 9 is similar to the provision in the ChinaPeru FTA in that it allows arbitration for any dispute. 215 Notably, in what is likely a concession to Colombia, it extends the time required to attempt to settle a dispute before going to arbitration from six months to nine months. 216 This change increases the probability of settling the dispute outside of arbitration and gives the state an opportunity to formulate a stronger defense.
The China-Chile FTA also follows trends begun in prior agreements. Although it was signed in 2005, the original agreement included only a short discussion on cooperation to promote investment and stated that the parties "will negotiate trade in services and investment after the conclusion of the negotiations of this Agreement." 217 After nearly seven years of negotiations, Chile and China agreed in 2012 on a supplementary investment chapter for the China-Chile FTA, which terminated the 1995 Chile-China BIT. 218 The investment chapter reflected BIT, supra note 184, arts. 3-4. Article 3 also includes a "grandfather" provision by stating that it applies "[w]ithout prejudice to its laws at the time the investment is made." China-Colombia BIT, supra note 212, art. 3. Article 3 also uses the NAFTA term "in like circumstances" to narrow the scope of interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause and the national treatment clause. Compare id. art. 3(1)-(3), with NAFTA, supra note 19, arts. 1102(1)-(3), 1103(1)-(2). See also Berger, supra note 83, at 10-11. Article 4 on expropriation and compensation mirrors the same provision in the China-Peru FTA. Compare China-Colombia BIT, supra note 212, art. 4, with Peru-China FTA, supra note 159, art. 133.
214. Berger, supra note 83, at 10; China-Colombia BIT, supra note 212, art. 2(4)(a) ("The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not require additional treatment to that required under the minimum standard of treatment of aliens in accordance with the standard of customary international law.").
215. China-Colombia BIT, supra note 212, art. 9(2). 219 The China-Chile FTA limits national treatment to stages after the establishment of an investment. 220 Like the Peru-China FTA, it does not give most-favored-nation treatment to dispute mechanisms. 221 The FTA also invokes customary international law as the minimum standard of treatment. 222 It further limits the minimum standard of treatment by stating that "a breach of other articles of this Agreement, or articles of other agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article." 223 Overall, the growing adoption of investment provisions first seen in NAFTA and the acceptance of the term "customary international law" show China's flexibility in using the model texts of its counterparties. However, China's unwillingness to agree to full investment liberalization by granting most-favorednation treatment to the pre-establishment phase could indicate that its adoption of NAFTA-like provisions likely comes more from its willingness to accommodate its counterpart in order to further its own interests rather than from a strategic change in its investment policy. 224 
V. A PACIFIC TRIANGLE
There are competing views as to what China's increased investment and increased number of investment agreements in Latin America means to the United States. While some view China's growing involvement in Latin America as a challenge to the United States, others view U.S. and Chinese interests in the region as aligned. 225 
A. Chinese and U.S. Interests in Latin America
Underlying the view that China represents a challenge to the United States in Latin America is the idea that China's growing economic power in the region brings with it increased influence that could be used to oppose U.S. interests and policies in the region. 226 For example, U.S. trade agreements with Latin American countries often require cooperation on human rights, environmental issues, or on U.S. national security concerns. 227 By contrast, trade relations with China are seen as less restrictive, and some argue that they could become an alternative to the U.S. approach. 228 Others argue that, while the United States and China could compete for markets and investments in Latin America, the two are not regional rivals. 229 Under this view, Latin America is only a part of China's global energy strategy and China has no geopolitical goals in the region. 230 Notably, the United States and China are economically intertwined in Latin America. Economic relations with the United States are a significant factor in Latin American economies, and continued economic growth in Latin America provides growing markets for Chinese goods. 231 Similarly, China's demand for natural resources has stimulated growth in Latin American economies and this growth has, in turn, increased Latin American demand for U.S. exports. 232 In addition, Chinese bank financing for Latin American infrastructure benefits the United States by improving Latin American export and import capabilities. 233 For these reasons, the United States should welcome China's increased economic activity in the region. 234 Although U.S. investment in Latin America is much greater than Chinese investment in the region, recent U.S. investment has waned, as U.S. companies have focused overseas investment in Asian emerging markets, especially in China. 235 Given this trend, Chinese investment in Latin America could be seen as a needed replacement for U.S. investment that can contribute to economic development. 236 However, China's focus on the region as a source of natural resources brings risks. For example, the effect of Chinese demand on natural resource prices can impact terms of trade for Latin American economies and make their exports of other goods less competitive. 237 There are similar concerns that China's demand for natural resources could lead to significant environmental damage and limit the region to being primarily an exporter of natural resources, thereby slowing Latin America's economic development. 238 There is also the possibility that Latin American countries could grow to resent Chinese investment as a dominant force in their economies. 239 The United States remains the main economic partner and source of investment for many Latin American countries. 240 Latin American governments, however, will likely look to China for the FDI needed to improve economic growth and will likely pursue more diversified Chinese investments in their economies to promote overall economic development. 241 The economies of China and many Latin American countries could also become more complementary, as Latin America's large and growing middle class could become an increasingly significant market for Chinese goods as well as a stable destination for investment in industries other than natural resources. 242 Overall, the attraction to China for Latin America is that China offers increased economic opportunities. 243 Part of this economic opportunity, as demonstrated by the goals of the Pacific Alliance, is trade and investment across the Asia-Pacific region. 244 
B. Possible Changes to U.S. Policy
While China is not necessarily a strategic threat to the United States in Latin America, given that Chinese economic influence in Latin America is likely to increase, U.S. policymakers should consider several changes to U.S. investment policies to promote cooperation from Latin American countries on human rights, labor, environmental issues, or U.S. national security concerns.
The United States could attempt to organize and integrate its FTAs with Pacific Alliance countries into one group. 245 This integration could be based around common investment-treaty standards not only for investment protections but also for labor and the environment. 246 The United States should give higher priority to economic development in order to pursue the more expansive goals of regional growth and stability. This would require future U.S. trade and investment agreements to allow partner countries the regulatory space needed to devise their own development policies without the threat of claims of indirect expropriation. 247 This can be accomplished through more explicit exceptions for development policies as well as for environmental and labor regulations. 248 These changes would also require adjustments to the current investor-state arbitration system. There are longstanding concerns that investor-state arbitration infringes on the ability of developing countries to regulate their economies, and there are concerns that the fear of an investor-state dispute can discourage governments from regulating or, at least, influence the way in which they regulate in areas related to the public interest. 249 To develop a fairer investment protection regime, system. 250 This could help mitigate controversy by avoiding some of the private challenges to government regulations on claims of indirect expropriation.
The changing global economy has in some ways made the current investor-state dispute system in U.S. treaties outdated. The system was developed when unstable governments in developing countries posed increased risks to U.S. investments. 251 These risks, however, decreased in many countries as their economies developed and their legal systems matured. 252 For example, the countries of the Pacific Alliance pose much lower investor risk when compared to Venezuela or Argentina. 253 Additionally, multi-national corporations with global operations and limited national allegiance are changing the balance of power in investment treaty law from one between capital-importing and capital-exporting countries to one between private capital and public interests. 254 Multi-national corporations can also use investor-state arbitration to an unfair advantage over smaller, domestic companies. 255 While renegotiating past BITs and FTAs could prove overly burdensome, the United States could consider these changes during the current negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multi-party trade and investment agreement that includes Chile and Peru, 256 and could one day include China. 257 Developing a major trade and investment agreement with investment provisions designed to promote economic development and labor and environmental standards could ensure that the United States continues to set the global standard for investment agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has pursued its investment policy in Latin America to develop legal standards to protect private investment and pursue economic growth. China has pursued investment in Latin America primarily to gain access to natural resources and raw materials for state-owned companies while placing less emphasis on international legal standards. In doing so, China has been flexible in treaty negotiations and has adopted some of the international legal standards that the United States promotes in Latin America. As a result, there has been some, although limited, convergence of Chinese investment treaties with U.S. standards.
While Chinese FDI brings significant benefits to Latin American countries, China's focus on natural resources could undermine economic development in the region. China's reduced emphasis on such issues as labor or environmental protection could also endanger economic stability. In response, the United States should consider changes to its international investment policy in order to continue to influence the development of international investment standards.
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